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Abstract. Starting from an empirical analysis of the network structure
of the Austrian inter-bank market, we study the flow of funds through
the banking network following exogenous shocks to the system. These
shocks are implemented by stochastic changes in variables like interest
rates, exchange rates, etc. We demonstrate that the system is relatively
stable in the sence that defaults of individual banks are unlikely to spread
over the entire network. We study the contagion impact of all individual
banks, meaning the number of banks which are driven into insolvency as
a result of a single bank’s default. We show that the vertex betweenness
of individual banks is linearly related to their contagion impact.
1 Introduction
With the development of new ideas and tools of analysis, physics has lately
strongly contributed to a functional understanding of the structure of complex
real world networks. A key insight of this research has been the discovery of
surprising structural similarities in seemingly very different networks, ranging
from internet technology to cell biology. See [1] for an overview. Remarkably,
many real world networks show power-law (scale free) degree distributions and
feature a certain pattern of cliquishness, quantified by the clustering coefficient.
Many also exhibit a so called small world phenomenon, meaning that the average
shortest path between any two vertices (”degrees of separation”) in the network
can be surprisingly small. Maybe one of the most important contributions to
recent network theory is an interpretation of these network parameters with re-
spect to stability, robustness, and efficiency of an underlying system. From this
perspective financial networks are a natural candidate to study. The financial
world can be thought of as a set of intermediaries i.e. banks who interact with
each other through financial transactions. These interactions are governed by a
set of rules and regulations, and take place on an interaction graph of all con-
nections between financial intermediaries. Financial crises i.e. the incapacity to
finance businesses and industries have recently hit several countries all around
the globe. These events have triggered a boom of papers on banking-crises, fi-
nancial risk-analysis and numerous policy initiatives to find and understand the
⋆⋆ The views and findings of this paper are entirely those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of Oesterreichische Nationalbank.
weak-points of the financial system. One of the major concerns in these debates
is the danger of so called systemic risk: the large scale breakdown of financial
intermediation due to domino effects of insolvency [2,3]. The network of mutual
credit relations between financial institutions is supposed to play a key role in
the risk for contagious defaults.
In the past the theoretical economic literature on contagion [4,5] suggest
network topologies that might be interesting to look at. In [4] it is suggested to
study a complete graph of mutual liabilities. The properties of a banking system
with this structure is then compared to properties of systems with non complete
networks. In [5] a set of different network structures is studied. However, so
far surprisingly little is known about the actual empirical network topology of
mutual credit relations between financial institutions.
In a recent paper we have for the first time analyzed empirical data to recon-
struct the banking network of Austria [6]. Here we characterized the interbank
network by the liability (or exposure) matrix L. The entries Lij are the liabilities
bank i has towards bank j. L is a square matrix but not necessarily symmetric.
We showed that the liability (Lij) size distribution follows a power law, which
can be understood as being driven by underlying size and wealth distributions
of the banks, which show similar power exponents. We find that the interbank
network shows – like many other realistic networks – power law dependencies in
the degree distributions. We could show that different scaling exponents within
the same distribution relate to different hierarchy levels in sub-networks (sec-
tors) within the total network. The scaling exponents by the agricultural banks
are very low, due to the hierarchical structure of this sector, while the other
banks lead to scaling exponents of sizes also found in other complex real world
networks. The interbank network shows a low clustering coefficient, a result that
mirrors the analysis of community structure which shows a clear network pat-
tern, where banks would first have links with their head institution, whereas
these few head institutions hold links among each other. A consequence of this
structure is that the interbank network is a small world with a very low ”degree
of separation” between any two nodes in the system.
2 Inter-Bank Topology and Flow of Contagion
The knowledge of the detailed structure of the interbank topology enables us to
use it as an input for a contagion-flow model [7], which is the main idea of this
paper. Unlike previous research where we studied random flow on structured
networks [8,9], here we follow the flow of payments uniquely determined by the
structure of the liability matrix. We use this flow to perform stress tests to the
system by artificially changing external financial parameters like interest rates,
exchange rates etc., mimicking conditions and ”global” events which are beyond
the influence of banks. By doing this we can answer questions about the stability
of the financial system with respect to external shocks, in particular, which banks
are likely to default due to shocks, and which banks will drag other banks into
default due to their mutual credit relations (contagion).
In the following we are looking for the bilateral liability matrix L of all (about
N = 900) Austrian banks, the Central Bank (OeNB) and an aggregated foreign
banking sector. Our data consists of 10 L matrices each representing liabilities
for quarterly single month periods between 2000 and 2003. T obtain these data,
we draw upon two major sources from the Austrian Central Bank: the Austrian
bank balance sheet data base (MAUS) and the major loan register (GKE). The
Austrian banking system has a sectoral organization due to historic reasons.
Banks belong to one of seven sectors: savings banks (S), Raiffeisen (agricultural)
banks (R), Volksbanken (VB), joint stock banks (JS), state mortgage banks
(SM), housing construction savings and loan associations (HCL), and special
purpose banks (SP). Banks have to break down their balance sheet reports on
claims and liabilities with other banks according to the different banking sectors,
Central Bank and foreign banks. This practice of reporting on balance interbank
positions breaks the liability matrix L down to blocks of sub-matrices for the
individual sectors. Banks with a head institution have to disclose their positions
with the head institution, which gives additional information on L. Since many
banks in the system hold interbank liabilities only with their head institutions,
one can pin down many entries in the L matrix exactly. This information is
combined with the data from the major loans register of OeNB. This register
contains all interbank loans above a threshold of 360 000 Euro. This information
provides us with a set of constraints and zero restrictions for individual entries
Lij . Up to this point one can obtain about 90% of the L-matrix entries ex-
actly. For the rest we employ entropy maximization method [6]. The estimation
problem can be set up as a standard convex optimization problem: Assume we
have a total of K constraints. The column and row constraints take the form∑N
j=1 Lij = b
r
i ∀ i and
∑N
i=1 Lij = b
c
j ∀ j with r denoting row and c de-
noting column. Constraints imposed by the knowledge about particular entries
in Lij are given by b
l ≤ Lij ≤ b
u for some i, j The aim is to find the matrix
L that has the least discrepancy to some a priori matrix U with respect to the
(generalized) cross entropy measure
C(L,U) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Lij ln
(
Lij
Uij
)
. (1)
U is the matrix which contains all known exact liability entries. For those entries
(bank pairs) ij where we have no knowledge from Central Bank data, we set
Uij = 1. We use the convention that Lij = 0 whenever Uij = 0 and define
0 ln(0
0
) to be 0. As a result we obtain a rather precise picture of the interbank
relations at a particular point in time. Given L we find that the distribution
of liabilities follows a power law for more than three decades with an exponent
of −1.87 [6]. To extract the network topology from these data, for the present
purposes we ignore directions and define an undirected but weighted adjacency
matrix Awij = Lij + Lji, which measures the gross interbank interaction, i.e. the
total volume of liabilities and assets for each node. We next test the validity
of our estimate of L, by computing the implied community structure and then
comparing it to the known real bank-clusters, i.e. the sectors. There exist various
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Fig. 1. (a) Community structure of the Austrian interbank market network from
the same data (Awclip). The dissimilarity index is a measure of the ”differentness”
of the clusters. (b) Empirical degree distribution of the interbank connection
network. Histograms are from aggregated data from the 10 datasets. (c) Conta-
gion impact as a function of relative node betweenness for the L matrix. Below
a value of B(i) of 0.6 no contagion impact is found.
ways to find functional clusters within a given network. In [10] an algorithm was
introduced which – while having at least the same performance rates as [11]
– provides an additional measure for the differences of cluster, the so-called
dissimilarity index. For analyzing our interbank network we apply this latter
algorithm to the weighted adjacency matrix Aw. As the only preprocessing step
we clip all entries in Aw above a level of 300 m Euro for numerical reasons, i.e.
Awclip = min(A
w , 300m). The community structure obtained in this way can be
compared to the actual community structure in the real world. The result for
the community structure obtained from one representative data set is shown in
Fig. 1 a. The algorithm associates banks with their corresponding sectors, like R,
VB, and S. For banks which in reality are not structured in a strong hierarchical
way, such as banks in the SP, JS, SM, HCL sectors, no significant community
structure is expected. By the algorithm these banks are grouped together in a
cluster called ’other’. The Raiffeisen sector, which has a sub-structure in the
federal states, is further grouped into clusters which are clearly identified as R
banks within one of the eight federal states (B,St,K,V,T,N,O,S). In Fig. 1 a these
clusters are marked as e.g. ’RS’, ’R’ indicating the Raiffeisen sector, and ’S’ the
state of Salzburg. Overall, there were 31 mis-specifications into wrong clusters
within the total N = 883 banks, which is a mis-specification rate of 3.5 %,
demonstrating the quality of the dissimilarity algorithm and – more importantly
– the quality of the entropy approach to reconstruct the matrix L.
Like many real world networks, the degree distribution of the interbank mar-
ket follows a power law for the tail of graph A, Fig. 1 b. The exponent is
γtail(A) = 2.01. We have checked that the distribution for the low degrees is
almost entirely dominated by banks of the R sector. Typically in the R sector
most small agricultural banks have links to their federal state head institution
and very few contacts with other banks, leading to a strong hierarchical struc-
ture. This hierarchical structure is perfectly reflected by the small scaling expo-
nents. Betweenness is a measure of centrality that considers the position of nodes
in-between the shortest paths (geodesics) that link any other nodes of the net-
work. Let gjk be the number of geodesics linking nodes j and k. If all geodesics
are equally likely to be chosen the probability of taking one of them is 1/gjk.
The probability that a particular node i lies on the geodesics between j and k
is denoted by gjik. The betweenness B for node i is defined as the sum of these
probabilities over all pairs of nodes not including node i. B(i) = M
∑
j,k gjik/gjk,
M being some normalization constant. B has a minimum value of zero when i
falls on no geodesics and a maximum at (N − 1)(N − 2)/2, which is the number
of pairs of nodes not including i. We use a relative version, i.e. M is such that
the sum of B(i) over all N nodes adds up to 100%. Finally, the average path
length in the (undirected) interbank connection network A is ℓ¯(A) = 2.26±0.03.
A is unweighted, meaning Aij = 1 for A
w
ij 6== 0 and Aij = 0 else. From these
results the Austrian interbank network looks like a very small world with about
three degrees of separation. This result looks natural in the light of the commu-
nity structure described earlier. The two and three tier organization with head
institutions and sub-institutions apparently leads to short interbank distances
via the upper tier of the banking system and thus to a low degree of separation.
The framework here is a model of a banking system based on a detailed de-
scription of the structure of interbank exposures L [7]. The model explains the
feasible payment flows between banks endogenously from the given structure of
interbank liabilities, net values of the banks arising from all other bank activities
and an assumption about the resolution of insolvency for different random draws
from a distribution of risk-factor changes, such as interest rate, foreign exchange
rate and stockmarket changes, as well as changes in default frequencies for cor-
porate loans. We expose the banks’ financial positions apart from interbank
relations to interest rate, exchange rate, stock market and business cycle shocks.
For each state of the world, the network model uniquely determines endoge-
nously actual, feasible interbank payment flows. Taking the feedback between
banks from mutual credit exposures and mutual exposures to aggregate shocks
explicitly into account we can calculate default frequencies of individual banks
across states. The endogenously determined vector of feasible payments between
banks also determines the recovery rates of banks with exposures to an insolvent
counterparty. We are able to distinguish bank defaults that arise directly as a
consequence of movements in the risk factors and defaults which arise indirectly
because of contagion. The model therefore yields a decomposition into funda-
mental and contagious defaults. Risk scenarios are created by exposing those
positions on the bank balance sheet that are not part of the interbank business
to interest rate, exchange rate, stock market and loan loss shocks. In order to
do so we undertake a historic simulation using market data, except for the loan
losses where we employ a credit risk model. In the scenario part we use data from
Datastream, the major loans register, as well as statistics of insolvency rates in
various industry branches from the Austrian rating agency (Kreditschutzver-
band von 1870). For each scenario the estimated matrix of bilateral exposures
L and the income positions determine via the network model a unique vector of
feasible interbank payments and thus a pattern of insolvency. The basic idea is
to determine the feasible flows of funds in the banking network that can occur
Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of the default flow model: At the initial state each
bank is fully characterized by its wealth e0 and its liabilities to other banks L.
We expose each bank to stochastic shocks which model the market risk and the
credit risk separately. The introduced risk changes the positions of the banks to
new levels e1. The crucial step is the clearing of the system where the structure
of L becomes important. The result of the clearing is a vector p∗i of payments
bank i has to pay to the other banks in the system. If a component of this vector
becomes less than the obligations di to pay to all the other banks di =
∑
j Lij
bank i is insolvent.
after a realization of risk factor changes by a clearing procedure in which credi-
tors that can not fulfill their payment promises (L) are proportionally rationed.
One can show that a unique clearing vector always exists under mild regularity
conditions [12]. The clearing vector can be found constructively as follows: for
the given portfolio positions of banks ei and the given risk factor changes we
assume that every bank would pay its interbank liabilities as specified by L.
If under this assumption one bank has a negative net value it is insolvent and
its creditors receive a proportional claim on the remaining value of the insolvent
bank. All banks with positive value are assumed to honor their promises fully. In
a second iteration it can happen that under the new vector of feasible payment
flows banks that were previously solvent are now insolvent because the value of
their interbank claims is reduced impairing their capacity to pay. One can show
that this procedure converges to a unique clearing payment vector p∗ for the sys-
tem as a whole. From the clearing vector found in this way one can directly read
three pieces of information: first all banks that have a component in the vector
that is smaller than the sum of their promises as specified by L are insolvent.
The loss given default can be determined because it requires only a compari-
son between what has been promised (given by L) and what value can actually
be payed (given by the clearing payment vector). Furthermore, insolvency cases
can be distinguished by their occurrence in the clearing algorithm. Banks that
are insolvent in the first round are fundamentally insolvent, others are insolvent
Table 1. Simulation results for probabilities of fundamental and contagious
defaults. A fundamental default is due to losses arising from exposures to mar-
ket and non-bank credit risk. Contagious defaults are triggered by the default of
another bank that cannot fulfill its promises. The probability that only funda-
mental defaults occur is shown as well as the probability that fundamental and
contagious defaults are observed.
Fundamental Defaults No Contagion Contagion Total
0-10 93.38% 0.01% 93.39%
11 to 20 2.82% 0.40% 3.22%
21 to 30 0.11% 1.04% 1.15%
31 to 40 0.00% 0.40% 0.40%
41 to 50 0.00% 0.53% 0.53%
Total 96.31% 3.69% 100.00%
because the value of interbank claims has been reduced by the insolvency of oth-
ers. Their insolvency can therefore be interpreted as contagious. The analysis of
these data then allows us to assess the risk exposure – in particular for defaults
– of all banks at a system level. The details of the model are described in [7].
3 Results and Conclusions
The given banking system is very stable and default events that could be classi-
fied as a ”systemic crisis” are unlikely. We find that the mean default probability
of an Austrian bank to be below one percent. Perhaps the most interesting find-
ing is that only a small fraction of bank defaults can be interpreted as contagious.
The vast majority of defaults is a direct consequence of macroeconomic shocks.
More specifically, we find the median endogenous recovery rates to be 66%, and
we show that the given banking system is quite stable to shocks from losses in
foreign counterparty exposure and we find no clear evidence that the interbank
market either increases correlations among banks or enables banks to diversify
risk. Using our model as a simulation tool, we show that market share in the
interbank market alone is not a good predictor of the relevance of a bank for the
banking system in terms of contagion risk. Table 1 shows the decomposition of
simulation scenarios with and without contagion following a fundamental default
of a given number of banks. The simulation is run under the assumption that
there is a recovery rate of 50% of loans to non banks and that the full value of
an insolvent institution is transferred to the creditors. Clearing is done after the
netting of interbank claims in L.
Finally, we ask the question of the impact of individual bank defaults on
other banks. More specifically, if one particular bank becomes erased from the
network, how many other banks become insolvent due to this event? We call this
conditional contagion impact on default of a specific bank. This is similar in spirit
to looking at avalanche distributions triggered by controlled toggling of grains
in a sandpile. We observe the portfolio positions ei of banks from our database.
Instead of simulating risk factor changes that are applied to this portfolio and
are then cleared in a second step we artificially eliminate the funds of each bank
one at a time, clear the system, and count the number of contagious (induced)
defaults. This is repeated N times so that each bank becomes removed, and all
the others are present. We find that only 13 banks – when defaulting – drag more
than one other bank into default. There are 16 banks which will cause one single
default of one other bank. A natural guess would be to relate the contagion
impact of a specific bank to its role in the network. Amongst many possible
measures, we find that the betweenness of the defaulting bank is directly related
to the contagion impact. This is shown in Fig. 1 c, where a linear relation between
the betweenness B(i) and the contagion impact is suggested for B(i) > 2.
In this work we combined the knowledge of the detailed structure of a real
world banking network with an economic model, which allows to estimate the
functional stability and robustness of the financial network. This model adds
a dynamical component to the ”static” liability matrix, which is nothing else
but the promise for future financial flows between the banks. By stochastically
varying external parameters of the system like interest rate shocks, we can follow
the flow of financial transactions, and in particular can scan for defaults occurring
in the system, due to insolvency. The results of this work is that the system seems
to be relatively robust, and the probability for a contagious spread over the whole
network is very small. However, there are several key banks (not including the
Central bank), which upon their default, will lead to a considerable number of
other banks defaulting as well. We showed that these key banks can be reliably
identified by the vertex betweenness. We think that the existence of a threshold
in the variable B(i) in a ”quasi” scale-free network, combined with complex
but realistic contagion dynamics is a remarkable finding which is worthwhile to
examine further.
References
1. Dorogovtsev, S.N. and Mendes, J.F.F.: Evolution of Networks: From Biological
Nets to the Internet and WWW, Oxford University Press (2003)
2. Hartmann, P. and DeBandt, O.: Systemic Risk: An Overview. European Central
Bank Working Paper (2000) 35
3. Summer, M.: Banking Regulation and Systemic Risk. Open Econ. Rev. 1 (2003) 43
4. Allen, F. and Gale, D.: Financial Contagion. J Polit. Econ. 108 (2000) 1
5. Thurner, S., Hanel, R., Pichler, S.: Risk trading, network topology, and banking
regulation. Quantitative Finance 3 (2003) 306
6. Boss, M., Elsinger, H., Summer, M., Thurner, S.: The Network Topology of the
Interbank Market. SFI working paper # 03-10-055; cond-mat/0309582 (2003)
7. Elsinger, H., Lehar, A., Summer, M.: Risk Assessment of Banking Systems. Aus-
trian National Bank working paper 79 (2002).
8. Tadic´, B., Thurner, S.: Information Super-Diffusion on Structured Networks, Phys-
ica A 332 (2004) 662
9. Tadic´, B., Thurner, S., Rodgers, G. J.: Traffic on complex networks: Towards under-
standing global statistical properties from microscopic density fluctuations. Phys.
Rev. E (2004) in press
10. Zhou, H.: Distance, dissimilarity index, and network community structure. Phys.
Rev. E 67 (2003) 061901
11. Girvan, M. and Newman, M.E.J.: Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 99 (2002) 7831
12. L. Eisenberg and T. Noe, Systemic Risk in Financial Systems. Management Science
47 (2001) 236
